|
|
|
Coffman,
Edward M. The War To End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World
War I. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.
When Coffman set out to write a history of the American military
experience in World War One, he had two major goals in mind: to be more
comprehensive than previous accounts of the U.S. in the war, and to include what
he calls “the human element” in his analysis of the battles of the Great War—modeling
John Keegan’s accounts of WWII and including not just a “headquarters”
view of campaigns but also narratives of real Americans in the war.
In both respects this is a remarkable book, and because Coffman has dug
so deeply into various first-person narratives this study provides a solid
overview of the American soldiers’ role between 1917 and 1918, as well as the
broad political decision-making that was necessary for such an undertaking. He
begins in early 1917 with an essentially unprepared America, and relates how
initial confusion, militarily and politically, made an efficient American army
an unlikely proposition. Because
the U.S. accepted significant allied help, they moved ahead in spite of severe
limitations and Coffman walks the reader through the resulting training camps,
including accounts of psychological testing, shortages of weaponry (some
soldiers did not actually see particular weapons until arrival in France!), the
realities of racism, entertainment, and the impact of sickness.
He notes that 31% of all American soldiers in WWI who died, did so in
training camps. The navy faced
similar unpreparedness issues, but thanks in large part to the efficiency of
Rear Admiral William Sims, the U.S. was able to coordinate its naval efforts and
hinder severely the effectiveness of the German U-boats.
America’s air force was also ill-equipped to fight a war, but that
military branch also responded quickly and Coffman tells of their eventual
success, including the exciting exploits of Billy Mitchell and Eddie
Rickenbacker. The
bulk of Coffman’s study concentrates on the efforts of General John Pershing
to build an American army and the ensuing battles he fought with that army, both
politically and on the actual fighting fronts in France.
Two major, ongoing obstacles to allowing U.S. soldiers to fight
physically, were the equally important battles of equipment supply and avoiding
amalgamation—both of which required tremendous political/diplomatic
maneuvering and resulted in some key compromises.
Coffman notes that into the spring of 1918, as the allied situation
continued to be desperate, “Both the British and the French thought in terms
of the battle and their desperate need for reinforcements, while Pershing
considered their appeals as efforts to thwart the formation of an independent
American army.” (172) Undoubtedly
the most gripping parts of this study are when Coffman turns his attention to
the actual battles, including the offensives of 2nd Marne, Soissons,
St. Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne. One
can almost feel the nearby explosions and the sounds and smell of the gas, as
the author describes the battles and the attendant confusion that came with
coordinating tens of thousands of men across hundreds miles of territory.
Ultimately it was the energy and sheer numbers of American soldiers who
forced the Germans into retreat, though the skill of the enemy’s retreat
continued to make the summer and fall of 1918 extremely dangerous.
Even more importantly, WWI gave American leaders key experience in a “modern”
war. Coffman notes, “Closest to
the hearts of the American commanders and staff officers, however, was the proof
that they could successfully plan and conduct an indepenent operation of this
magnitude.” (283) As
many contend still, this is probably the best single volume on the American
experience in the First World War.
Kennedy,
David M. Over Here: The First World War and American Society. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1980.
Heralded as one of the finest accounts of the U.S.
home front during WWI, Kennedy argues that Americans did not act “in concert”
during their involvement in the war, especially when it came to agreement on
how to finance military expenditures. Even
the decision to enter the war was met with a wide-ranging disparity of views,
ranging from Republicans, to socialists, to women’s groups, to Progressives.
The master-strategist Wilson mustered his forces to “convince” the
nation’s citizenry, especially through agencies like Creel’s CPI, that the
war was needed to for principles like “democracy” and “progress”.
Collateral damage, Kennedy contends, was deep division within Wilson’s
own Progressive camp, who believed that pro-war sentiment did not correspond
with Progressive aims. Once committed to helping the Allies, the
mobilization of the home front became an ongoing picture of divisions between
political, business, and social leaders.
Kennedy notes, “the politics of mobilization . . . reflected enduring
differences in principle about the character of American life–especially
about the proper role of the state in an industrial democracy.” (97)
One enduring legacy of economic mobilization and the conflict it
generated was what Kennedy calls a fiscal-ideological revolution involving
increased progressive taxation. In
fiscal changes as well as other aspects of increased government control, such
as that wielded by the War Industries Board, Wilson’s methodology was to
find a compromise between the dissenting forces and to invest the various
agencies with “ambiguous” powers that would satisfy the “diversity of
interests” involved. Mobilizing an army was another example of compromise
between competing ideals in American society.
Even the name Selective Service, implying a voluntary component
to serving in the army, revealed that “society was plagued by painful
ideological tensions,” states Kennedy. (154)
The author then details how the draft was carried out, including its
socio-economic bases, limited but important draft resistance, training methods
used, the glorious ideals of warfare from American history, and Pershing’s
battle not to deploy an amalgamated force.
When the American troops did arrive, their sheer numbers are what
allowed for a boost to Allied morale and an extremely quick Allied victory. Kennedy also paints a tension-filled picture of the
aftermath of WWI for American society both domestically and internationally.
The failure to agree on political, military, and economic issues before
and during the war, led to a series of socio-economic crises after 1918 and
demobilization, perhaps highlighted by Wilson’s contradictory policy of
wanting strong American political participation in the post-war international
order without a fully committed economic involvement, a policy that divided
Americans politically and added to eventual economic instability worldwide.
Given the divisions at home, Kennedy lauds Wilson for being able to
accomplish as much as he did in the Versailles process, but he nonetheless
holds that America emerged from the war similar to how it entered—divided.
|
