Hofstadter, Richard. Social Darwinism in American Thought. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944; rev. ed. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.

Hofstadter holds that no theory had more impact on American thinking than evolution.  He argues that from the late 19^th century to the WWI era, Social Darwinian ideals shifted from a conservative starting point in which individualism was stressed, to a politically liberal stance that emphasized the collective, communal spirit of the nation.  Beginning with eager acceptance from scientists, Darwin’s theories were incorporated into the nation’s universities, and quickly gained widespread popularity, even among mainline Christian churches and religious leaders.  As long as Americans believed in the mythic Horatio Alger individual, the laissez-faire/natural law aspects of social Darwinism prevailed.  Once the middle-class began to challenge the opportunism and exploitation of such ideals, a collective Darwinism gained precedence.

In order to show the influence of Darwinism on American thought, Hofstadter examines numerous individuals from the 1870s forward.  He starts with Herbert Spencer, the originator of the “survival of the fittest” adaptation of Darwin’s thought.  Spencer held that humanity’s inherent social adaptations would lead to inevitable human perfection, but that cooperative “help” in industrial society must be voluntary only.  Thus began the conservative, individualistic starting point to which many gravitated, including early business giants like Andrew Carnegie.  Hofstadter states, “Spencer’s doctrines were imported into the Republic long after individualism had become a national tradition.  Yet in the expansive age of our industrial culture he became the spokesman of that tradition, and his contribution materially swelled the stream of individualism if it did not change its course” (50).

He also focuses on William Graham Sumner, who helped assimilate and popularize a conservative, individualistic Social Darwinism.  Sociologist Lester Ward, although a critic of laissez-faire individualism and a believer in social planning, nonetheless adapted Darwinian ideals to society as a whole, contending that the origin of organized society comes through the conquest of one race by another.  Other critics of Darwinism, often citing the inadequacy of a laissez-faire approach in American life, included social gospel adherents, Marxian sociologists, Progressive reformers, and pragmatists like William James and John Dewey.  Hofstadter also notes the minimal influence of Social Darwinism on economics, and its considerable impact on sociology and eugenics.

The author surveys how considerably this new worldview shaped racism and imperialism around the century’s turn, especially through Anglo-Saxonism.  Acknowledging the long history of American racism before the 1870s, Hofstadter notes, “Although Darwinism was not the primary source of the belligerent ideology and dogmatic racism of the late nineteenth century, it did become a new instrument in the hands of the theorists of race and struggle” (172).  John Fiske, Teddy Roosevelt, Josiah Strong, and others used Darwinism to justify American racial and expansion efforts.

            Though extremely thought-provoking, the limitations of the Hofstadter thesis include its narrow focus of what Darwinism was.  Belonging to the consensus school of historians, he believed that the American character, shared values, and institutions were much more limited than would be thought today.  Thus, he limited the Darwinian movement to laissez-faire economics, militarism, racism, and imperialism.  Hofstadter also seems to see Social Darwinists everywhere, though the issue of such “influence” is often difficult to prove.  Nonetheless, this is a wide-sweeping panorama of American intellectual life that must be read by all serious historians of the era.

 

 

Dawley, Alan. Struggles for Justice: Social Responsibility and the Liberal State. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.  

            In this sweeping panorama of American political and social development between the Gilded Age and the Great Depression, Dawley explores the basic tension that he believes defined America in the modern era: how to reconcile a dynamic society with conceptions of 19^th-century liberalism.  The old notions of political liberalism such as egalitarianism, self-government, rugged individualism, and protection for the family farm were increasingly distant realities as the nineteenth century faded and the twentieth emerged, yet the ideals of that former liberalism remained—leading to frequent clashes.  Those conflicts dealt with differing conceptions of labor, gender roles, and racial and ethnic tensions, and in the midst of all these difficulties loomed the question of the proper role of government.

            Dawley divides his study into three periods, beginning with the late 1800s and running to the eve of WWI.  In the first period, dominated increasingly by big-business interests, laissez-faire liberalism ruled and allowed for tremendous social inequality as corporate powers manipulated American politics and its citizens.  Though ethnic, labor, gender, and racial struggles were frequent, their success was limited because economic power and imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and the tremendous nationalism that ensued, helped the government to justify the status quo.

            Between the period before WWI and 1924 another “type” of liberal state emerged, based on one of two “national elite” strategies to maintain control.  Progressive liberalism saw the state finally incorporating some of the reform ideals of the early twentieth century, and was championed especially by Woodrow Wilson, but still favored the wealthy and large capital interests and was not as “progressive” as the stereotype of trust-busting implies.  The war, however, destroyed such progressive reform and instead issued in the strategy of managerial liberalism.  The state used the corporate model to control mass society, but was unable to continue these emergency measures effectively after the war, so that classic liberalism and the power of big business reemerged, along with a renewed sense of racial and foreign resentment.

            The imbalances of the early twentieth century were finally solved when the crisis of the Great Depression forced the governing elites to wrestle with their proper role over society.  Dawley argues that Roosevelt built upon the managerial liberal ideals of Hoover in constructing the New Deal welfare state that reigned in corporate greed and replaced liberty and equality with “security” as the central feature of American liberalism.  He writes, “the New Deal enshrined a new set of ruling values keyed to security, so that the mass of the population . . . felt as if the government cared about their welfare.” (395)

            As with any work of this scope, there are some key limitations.  For example, the title indicates that “justice” and “social responsibility” are the key issues for the liberal state during these decades, yet we never really learn what those things mean.  The size of the study also means that neither cultural or intellectual historians will be entirely satisfied—not enough statistics and not enough “real” people!  There also is a fairly obvious bias in Dawley’s portrayal of the “heroes” during the decades he covers.  Those who get the most favorable coverage are the “radicals”, whether fighting for gender rights, labor rights, racial equality, or a host of other causes.  Nonetheless, this is an important work to wrestle with in understanding the relationship of the liberal state to the emerging modern society.